Chapter II. WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE IN THE NATURE OF THINGS THAT THE WORLD SHOULD BE AT PEACE AT this stage I would like to put a question in my opinion a great and important onenamely, whether this world can by nature be without conflict, and at peace ? I reply that it can by no means be so ; and on this, I will put forward a proposition with arguments from the philosophers.

It is impossible for the sky to be at rest, that is, for it not to move from one place, for in its continual turning from East to West which takes place each day it is not
without movement, and terrestrial bodies move in accordance with the movement of the heavens. Hence it clearly appears that motion takes place among terrestrial bodies. A stronger reason : terrestrial bodies are governed by celestial bodies, according to the philosophers. It is clear that celestial bodies cause to exist, in terrestrial bodies, natures mutually repugnant by diversity of properties. This may be seen in the case of the moon, for when it is full it engenders in earthly things strength and virtue, but when it is waning earthly things are feebler and less virtuous. Thus the opinion appears true. I can give you a clear instance. Aristotle says that, of necessity, in this world earthly bodies derive their condition and nature from the disposition of the stars. But it is plain that among the stars there is by nature rebellion and contrariety, for one engenders heat, another cold ; one love, another dissension ; one luxury, another chastity ; one blood, another melancholy. Then since there is contradiction between these heavenly bodies it most certainly exists among earthly bodies, which are governed by their movements.

You may see patent and manifest examples of this. There are many cities that from their first foundation are close bound up, although their love does not come from any merit, or from any service that one has done the other at any time since their beginnings. You fmd, on the other hand, towns and cities which from their beginnings have hated each other, although neither one has done the other any harm. The same is true of two persons when they see each other for the first time. And you may find two people who at the first sight of each other love each other, although neither has done the other any good. And you may see two others who at sight hate each other. A still stronger case is of the man who has never seen some other man, and yet hates him to the death, or will bear him a strong love, only from what he has heard of him.

A man, too, who has never seen two knights who are to engage in combat will by nature be more inclined to praise and to hope for the honour of the one than of the other, as soon as he sees them in battle. This results, according to the opinion of the philosophers, from the causes cited above, and therefore I pray you to consider whether this may be a true thing. I ask first what was the origin of the combat between Jacob and Esau in their mother's womb, for it is wonderful that they, who were not yet born, should strive. I should much like to know and understand the reasons for such contest, and what it was that urged one to desire victory over the other, but in truth I say that no man could give account for it, unless by figure of speech, or by imagination. A natural philosopher would say that it proceeds from the disposition I have mentioned of the sky and the celestial bodies. We see that, by its nature, each thing created in this world assumes nature and condition to resist its contrary, as in the case of water, to which has been given the condition of opposing fire, by nature. Similarly we see how, among brute beasts, one is by nature inclined to kill the other ; for, though a dog may never have seen a wolf, the first time he sees one he will rush at him, and the wolf will do the same to the dog. Now, how does this happen ? In truth, I say that this comes from the condition and quality which are repugnant in these two animals, just as cold is by nature and condition repugnant to heat, and heat to cold.

I ask then, since such rebellion and disaccord occur by nature among other creatures, if human nature, which is the noblest of all, must not also possess this condition, namely, that one person should oppose another when they are of diverse complexions? This must indeed be the case, and it is of common occurrence. If there are two lords in a country, one will be of one complexion and the other of another. Perhaps one loves justice and the other simony, one merchants and the other soldiers, one is inclined to peace and the other to war, one loves the King of France and the other the King of England. Similarly if there are two men in an inn, one will be inclined to eat early and the other late, one to speak overmuch and the other to listen, and one will want white wine and the other red. So I may say that from the disposition of the human body there can be but little accord in this world, for, as a decretal says : " There are as many opinions and wills as there are men." Hence we say that in Rome, at its foundation, there could not be two kings together, that is to say, Romulus and Remus, for one killed the other.

But I do not say that God could not bring peace everywhere, or that, if all men were wise and good it would be impossible for them to live in peace ; for, as we say, the wise man will be lord of the stars. That is to say that if, by his understanding and corporal inclination, or by the planets, he is tempted to make war, yet by the virtue of wisdom he will overcome the inclination of the flesh. Nevertheless, a decretal says that the number of wise men is small and of fools great, and because the simple are unable to be lords of the planets or of the heavenly influences, by the inclination of nature and of the flesh they often raise wars in the world. I do not say, however, that there is never war among wise men and for just reason ; for sometimes wars are begun by simple folk, or are undertaken foolishly, and then those that come after and know not the reasons make worthy war, for each thinks he is in the right because he is ignorant of the first cause of the war.